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“The	  appeal	  of	  numbers	  is	  especially	  compelling	  to	  bureaucratic	  officials	  
who	  lack	  a	  mandate	  of	  popular	  election	  or	  divine	  right;	  scientific	  objectivity	  
thus	  provides	  an	  answer	  to	  a	  moral	  demand	  for	  impartiality	  and	  fairness;	  is	  
a	  way	  of	  making	  decisions	  without	  seeming	  to	  decide.”	  T.	  M.	  Porter,	  1995.	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Summary	  
The	  DG	  JRC	  organised	  in	  9-­‐10	  June	  2015	  a	  workshop	  “Significant	  Digits:	  Responsible	  Use	  of	  
Quantitative	  Information”1,	  mostly	  targeted	  at	  European	  Commission’s	  colleagues,	  which	  
invited	  to	  reflection	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  irresponsible	  misuse	  of	  quantitative	  information	  in	  
policy	  relevant	  matters.	  The	  event	  was	  opened	  by	  Vladimír	  Šucha,	  Director	  General	  of	  DG	  
JRC,	  producing	  a	  tide	  of	  ‘insignificant	  digits’.	  
Vladimír	  Šucha	  welcomed	  this	  workshop	  as	  a	  departing	  point	  to	  engage	  well-­‐known	  
criticisms	  of	  the	  irresponsible	  use	  of	  quantitative	  information	  to	  underpin	  policy	  making.	  He	  
argued	  that	  in	  many	  fields	  numbers	  are	  needed	  and	  therefore	  we	  should	  think	  of	  ways	  to	  
enhance	  their	  quality,	  as	  well	  as	  obtain	  support	  from	  other	  types	  of	  analysis	  such	  as	  
qualitative	  assessments	  and	  major	  integration	  of	  social	  sciences.	  He	  also	  remarked	  that	  the	  
request	  from	  the	  policy	  making	  spheres	  for	  quantitative	  information	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  
promises	  that	  many	  scholars	  make	  	  about	  the	  value	  of	  their	  numbers,	  the	  models	  that	  
generate	  them	  and	  the	  data	  from	  which	  they	  are	  crafted.	  Hence,	  he	  requested	  that	  this	  
workshop	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  constructive	  manner	  in	  order	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  we	  all	  
know	  exist,	  providing	  insight	  into	  the	  changes	  needed	  to	  challenge	  the	  current	  problems	  of	  
robustness	  and	  quality	  that	  many	  policy	  issues	  are	  facing.	  
Hence,	  the	  Significant	  Digits	  workshop	  looked	  at	  the	  quality,	  high	  and	  low,	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  
quantitative	  information	  to	  inform	  policy	  making.	  Through	  several	  examples,	  it	  looked	  into	  
uncertainty	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  it	  is	  tackled	  in	  very	  important	  sustainability	  related	  policy	  
files;	  hypocognition	  and	  “socially	  constructed	  ignorance”	  as	  symptoms	  of	  intentional	  or	  naïf	  
assumptions	  and	  simplifications	  of	  complex	  issues,	  namely	  in	  the	  energy,	  food	  and	  
agricultural	  sectors;	  the	  confounding	  of	  scales	  of	  analysis	  when	  using	  quantitative	  
information;	  serious	  misconceptions	  about	  probability	  leading	  to	  quantifauxcation;	  the	  lack	  
of	  social	  robustness	  of	  the	  indicators	  and	  models	  that	  are	  used	  to	  deal	  with	  complex	  societal	  
issues;	  the	  significance	  of	  quantitative	  information	  in	  a	  plurality	  of	  perspectives	  where	  
different	  sources	  of	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  are	  at	  stake;	  farfetched	  assumptions	  in	  
predictive	  models	  where	  there	  can	  never	  be	  adequate	  knowledge	  for	  effective	  support;	  and	  
realisation	  that	  quantitative	  information	  embed	  narratives	  and	  disciplinary	  perspectives	  that	  
represent	  specific	  perceptions	  of	  reality.	  The	  workshop	  recommended	  different	  ways	  of	  
working	  reflexively	  and	  deliberatively	  within	  imperfections,	  as	  uncertainty	  is	  intrinsic	  to	  
complex	  systems;	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  strong	  call	  for	  social	  sciences	  was	  put	  in	  all	  affairs	  
where	  science	  is	  relevant.	  
This	  report	  summarises	  the	  contributions	  of	  all	  speakers	  as	  well	  as	  the	  discussions	  held	  
during	  the	  workshop.	  It	  concluded	  that	  the	  analysis	  of	  bad	  practices	  is	  useful	  but	  not	  
enough,	  and	  taken	  in	  isolation	  it	  may	  indeed	  eventually	  become	  counterproductive.	  	  Hence,	  
the	  report	  concludes	  with	  recommendations	  for	  a	  way	  ahead	  at	  the	  JRC,	  suggesting	  activities	  
inside	  and	  outside	  the	  JRC.	  Training	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  operation	  at	  the	  European	  
Commission	  (scientific	  and	  policy	  officers	  alike)	  is	  an	  option	  to	  be	  considered.	  	  We	  suggest	  
that	  an	  extensive	  embedding	  of	  the	  users	  and	  trainers	  of	  the	  JRC’s	  reflexivity	  tools	  in	  its	  
regular	  work	  would	  provide	  a	  great	  service	  to	  the	  European	  policies	  it	  supports,	  and	  also	  to	  
the	  policy	  process	  in	  Europe	  and	  worldwide.	  This	  work	  could	  then	  be	  extended	  outside.	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  The	  relevant	  Science	  Hub	  page	  is:	  https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/event/conference/use-­‐quantitative-­‐information	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The	  workshop	  contributions	  
	  
Jerome	  Ravetz	  offered	  an	  
historical	  perspective	  on	  how	  and	  
why	  the	  crisis	  of	  ‘evidence-­‐based’	  
policy	  come	  to	  be.	  He	  claimed	  
that	  its	  deep	  origins	  lie	  in	  a	  
certain	  conception	  of	  knowledge,	  
which	  can	  besummed	  up	  as	  a	  
faith	  in	  digits	  as	  nuggets	  of	  truth.	  	  
As	  he	  pointed	  out,	  this	  is	  so	  deep	  
in	  our	  modern	  scientific	  culture,	  
“its	  exposure	  and	  correction	  will	  not	  be	  a	  quick	  or	  straightforward	  process”.	  Taking	  as	  
example	  the	  on-­‐going	  economic	  crisis,	  Ravetz	  questions	  the	  faith	  and	  reliance	  on	  numerical	  
data	  and	  mathematical	  methods	  of	  economists	  and	  other	  social	  practitioners,	  alike	  which	  
have	  showed	  us	  how	  ‘everything’	  can	  go	  wrong	  when	  they	  are	  applied	  incompetently.	  
Ravetz	  noted	  that	  this	  delusionary	  faith	  has	  complex	  roots,	  in	  traditions	  of	  philosophical	  
thought	  and	  social	  practice.	  	  Focusing	  on	  digits,	  as	  a	  core	  element	  and	  symptom	  of	  the	  
pathology,	  he	  suggested	  that	  “since	  so	  many	  policy	  issues	  now	  involve	  quantities	  with	  ‘not	  
even	  one	  significant	  digit’,	  we	  need	  an	  appropriate	  new	  arithmetical	  language,	  based	  on	  




Jeroen	  Van	  der	  Sluijs	  discussed	  the	  different	  types	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  how	  they	  are	  
dealt	  with	  at	  the	  science-­‐governance	  interface.	  He	  identified	  three	  framings	  of	  uncertainty	  
that	  correspond	  to	  three	  different	  understandings	  of	  it:	  the	  “deficit	  view”	  –	  uncertainty	  as	  a	  
temporary	  imperfection	  in	  our	  knowledge	  that	  will	  improve	  with	  more	  research;	  the	  
“evidence	  evaluation	  view”	  which	  recognises	  multiple	  voices	  in	  science	  but	  mediates	  this	  
into	  a	  shared	  consensus	  view	  and;	  the	  “complex	  systems	  view/	  post-­‐normal	  view”	  that	  sees	  
uncertainty	  as	  intrinsic	  to	  complex	  systems	  and	  requires	  working	  deliberatively	  within	  
imperfections.	  Uncertainty	  is	  much	  more	  than	  a	  number	  and	  there	  are	  many	  dimensions	  
(technical	  (inexactness),	  methodological	  (unreliability),	  epistemological	  (ignorance)	  and	  
societal	  (limited	  social	  robustness).	  	  
Drawing	  from	  several	  examples,	  Van	  der	  
Sluijs	  described	  different	  ways	  of	  dealing	  
with	  uncertainties	  within	  policy	  making	  
circles,	  namely	  listing:	  application	  of	  
Bayesian	  methods,	  consensus	  seeking,	  
nihilism	  –	  i.e.	  dumping	  the	  science,	  the	  
precautionary	  approach,	  weighing	  of	  
experts	  reputation	  or	  trust	  on	  experts	  
based	  on	  personal	  views	  or	  best	  fit	  for	  the	  
policy	  agenda	  and	  finally	  what	  he	  
described	  as	  the	  post-­‐normal	  approach	  
which	  seeks	  to	  explore	  the	  relevance	  of	  ignorance	  and	  devise	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  it.	  
Through	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  cases	  of	  hyper-­‐precise	  numbers	  e.g.	  the	  claim	  “7.9%	  of	  
species	  are	  predicted	  to	  become	  extinct	  from	  climate	  change”	  (Urban,	  2015)	  and	  the	  evolving	  
“The	  ideology	  of	  ‘speaking	  truth	  to	  power’	  is	  now	  obsolete,	  
even	  antique.	  	  But	  where	  do	  we	  go	  from	  here?	  	  (…)	  [An]	  
approach	  to	  quality	  (…)	  certainly	  involve[s]	  an	  ‘extended	  
peer	  community’.	  How	  will	  the	  mainstream	  scientific	  
enterprise	  respond	  to	  such	  a	  suggestion?	  	  However	  it	  is	  
implemented,	  it	  would	  involve	  a	  ceding	  of	  power	  and	  
legitimacy	  to	  some	  external	  agencies.	  (…)	  For	  that,	  we	  will	  
need	  a	  dialogue,	  and	  that	  dialogue	  must	  involve	  a	  deeper	  
critique	  of	  the	  dominant	  practice,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  universally	  
seen	  as	  unsustainable,	  both	  practically	  and	  morally.	  “	  
Jerome	  Ravetz	  
“We	  always	  simplify,	  so	  we	  tend	  to	  set	  very	  limited	  
system	  boundaries	  to	  keep	  scientific	  assessments	  
manageable,	  but	  we	  have	  to	  understand	  the	  impacts	  
of	  these	  design	  choices	  on	  the	  validity	  and	  scope	  of	  
the	  conclusions	  of	  such	  assessments.	  	  Stakeholder	  
engagement	  is	  ever	  more	  important.	  They	  are	  a	  useful	  
resource	  in	  co-­‐framing	  the	  problem	  and	  identifying	  
what	  is	  relevant	  to	  address,	  they	  can	  also	  provide	  
useful	  information	  and	  data	  that	  scientists	  have	  no	  
access	  to	  otherwise,	  and	  they	  can	  also	  be	  a	  critical	  
resource	  in	  quality	  control	  and	  extended	  peer	  review.”	  
Jeroen	  van	  der	  Sluijs	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definitions	  of	  the	  1.5-­‐4.5	  degrees	  climate	  sensitivity	  range	  he	  has	  offered	  a	  NUSAP	  based	  
methodology	  to	  underscore	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  numbers	  offered	  through	  
these	  concepts,	  including	  a	  close	  look	  into	  their	  pedigree,	  concluding	  that	  we	  need	  more	  
qualifiers	  of	  scientific	  information	  and	  improvement	  in	  terms	  of	  craft	  skills	  with	  numbers.	  
	  
	  
On	  his	  fight	  against	  what	  Lakoff	  in	  2004	  described	  as	  “hypocognition”	  and	  what	  Ravetz	  in	  
1986	  described	  as	  “socially	  constructed	  ignorance”,	  Mario	  Giampietro	  outlined	  the	  
importance	  of	  context,	  scale,	  storytelling	  and	  storyteller.	  	  
Through	  some	  examples	  of	  indicators	  in	  the	  energy	  and	  sustainability2	  fields	  he	  showed	  that	  
these	  issues	  are	  often	  overlooked	  and	  not	  even	  understood.	  He	  argued	  that	  we	  do	  have	  a	  
problem	  with	  the	  way	  quantitative	  science	  is	  used	  in	  the	  field	  of	  sustainability	  right	  now	  
because	  it	  is	  used	  with	  the	  purposes	  of	  prediction	  and	  control	  (risk	  assessment,	  optimal	  
solutions,	  best	  course	  of	  action.	  etc.).	  	  Of	  course,	  when	  dealing	  with	  complex	  systems	  we	  can	  
still	  use	  quantitative	  science	  to	  gather	  useful	  insights.	  He	  proposed	  to	  move	  away	  from	  
assessments	  based	  on	  “a	  single	  set	  of	  numbers”	  to	  assessments	  based	  on	  “expected	  
relations	  over	  several	  sets	  of	  numbers”	  i.e.	  quantitative	  analysis	  based	  on	  patterns	  and	  
grammars3	  that	  he	  called	  “quantitative	  story	  telling”.	  This	  implies	  a	  radical	  revolution	  in	  the	  
use	  of	  numbers	  in	  science	  for	  governance.	  	  In	  the	  Cartesian	  dream	  of	  prediction	  and	  control	  
numbers	  (supposed	  to	  be	  generated	  by	  good	  models	  developed	  within	  a	  sound	  story-­‐telling)	  
are	  used	  to	  indicate	  what	  is	  the	  best	  thing	  to	  do	  (to	  individuate	  optimal	  solutions).	  	  On	  the	  
contrary	  in	  quantitative	  story-­‐telling	  numbers	  are	  used	  to	  check	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  pre-­‐
analytical	  narratives	  determining	  the	  quantification	  and	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  chosen	  story-­‐
telling	  determining	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  a	  critique	  on	  the	  ecological	  footprint	  indicator	  in	  Giampietro,	  M.,	  &	  Saltelli,	  A.	  (2014).	  Footprints	  to	  
nowhere.	  Ecological	  Indicators,	  46,	  610-­‐621.	  
3	  A	  “grammar”	  is	  defined	  as	  consisting	  of	  a	  taxonomy	  (defining	  what	  is	  relevant	  according	  to	  predominant	  
perception);	  a	  lexicon	  (choosing	  what	  is	  observed	  and	  represented)	  and	  a	  set	  of	  production	  rules	  establishing	  
causality	  in	  the	  chosen	  representation,	  deciding	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  as	  either	  dependent	  or	  independent	  
variables.	  
“The	  damages	  of	  socially	  constructed	  ignorance	  are	  generated	  by	  either	  (or	  both)	  endorsement	  of	  
sloppy	  quantitative	  analysis	  (bad	  models	  or	  indicators);	  or	  endorsement	  of	  irrelevant	  storytelling.	  (…)	  
How	  many	  people	  do	  really	  believe	  that	  the	  most	  relevant	  problem	  that	  humankind	  has	  to	  face	  now	  is	  
to	  prevent	  a	  78cm	  rise	  in	  the	  sea	  level	  in	  the	  year	  2100?	  (…)	  I	  believe	  that	  ignorance	  is	  more	  due	  to	  
irrelevance	  of	  the	  chosen	  storytelling	  than	  to	  problems	  with	  the	  quantitative	  representation	  of	  
problems”	  Mario	  Giampietro	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Through	  an	  example	  from	  the	  fisheries	  sector	  in	  Norway,	  Dorothy	  Dankel	  illustrated	  
how	  entrenched	  positions	  of	  different	  stakeholders	  determine	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  known,	  
what	  information	  needs	  to	  be	  published	  or	  processed	  and	  how	  those	  are	  negotiated	  by	  all	  
stakeholders.	  In	  addition	  she	  showed	  the	  symbolic	  importance	  of	  the	  large	  number	  of	  
significant	  digits	  that	  arise	  from	  the	  stock	  assessment	  models	  that	  support	  the	  decision	  
making	  process,	  suggesting	  that	  those	  digits	  are	  not	  about	  precision	  of	  measurement	  but	  
about	  the	  outcome	  of	  negotiations	  as	  each	  extra	  tonne	  of	  assessed	  fish	  has	  political	  value.	  
Her	  story	  of	  Norwegian	  pelagic	  fishermen	  taking	  the	  lead	  on	  surveying	  stocks	  of	  pelagic	  
species	  in	  collaboration	  with	  national	  authorities	  but	  not	  being	  able	  to	  use	  the	  data	  they	  
collected	  by	  decision	  of	  the	  same	  scientists	  is	  a	  classic	  example	  of	  clashes	  of	  legitimacy	  
about	  knowledge	  governance.	  Ultimately,	  such	  situation	  puts	  in	  jeopardy	  trust	  in	  reference	  
scientific	  institutions	  with	  de	  facto	  scientific	  and	  political	  credibility.	  In	  addition,	  she	  made	  a	  
clear	  case	  for	  lack	  of	  quality	  assurance	  when	  the	  same	  scientists	  engage	  in	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  
roles	  as	  the	  developers,	  judgers,	  reviewers	  and	  messengers	  about	  stock	  assessments	  and	  
quotas.	  She	  suggests	  post-­‐normal	  framings,	  namely	  NUSAP	  as	  a	  way	  to	  work	  deliberately	  
within	  imperfections	  as	  numbers	  are	  essential	  for	  advice	  in	  the	  fisheries	  case;	  the	  excuse	  “it	  





“Another	  fantastic	  indicator	  is	  the	  “ecological	  footprint”.	  At	  the	  world	  level	  the	  only	  relevant	  factor	  
determining	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  ecological	  footprint	  is	  the	  growing	  requirement	  of	  land	  to	  capture	  CO2.	  But	  
this	  requirement	  is	  calculated	  in	  a	  very	  bizarre	  way.	  First	  of	  all,	  when	  dealing	  with	  energy	  security	  they	  
consider	  only	  the	  sink	  side:	  how	  much	  you	  need	  to	  capture	  CO2,	  but	  not	  how	  much	  land	  you	  need	  to	  produce	  
the	  energy	  emitting	  CO2.	  This	  implies	  assuming	  that	  fossil	  energy	  supply	  will	  be	  available	  forever	  and	  that	  the	  
forest	  (fixing	  CO2	  on	  the	  same	  hectare)	  will	  grow	  forever.	  	  In	  fact,	  if	  you	  are	  assessing	  the	  sink	  capacity	  of	  the	  
area	  (kg/m2)	  needed	  for	  catching	  a	  flow	  of	  CO2	  (kg/sec)	  either	  the	  sink	  capacity	  has	  to	  grow	  forever	  (the	  
value	  of	  kg	  that	  can	  be	  stored	  per	  m2	  keeps	  growing	  in	  time)	  or	  the	  requirement	  of	  hectares	  of	  forest	  must	  
increase	  in	  time.	  That	  is,	  unless	  you	  have	  an	  integral	  in	  time	  you	  cannot	  map	  a	  flow	  (kg/sec)	  on	  a	  sink	  
capacity	  (kg/m2);	  it	  is	  dimensionally	  wrong.	  	  We	  can	  only	  conclude	  that	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  analytical	  
tools	  used	  right	  now	  to	  study	  sustainability	  is	  based	  on	  an	  equation	  where	  the	  dimensions	  on	  the	  left	  are	  not	  
the	  same	  as	  the	  dimensions	  on	  the	  right.	  How	  is	  it	  possible?	  It	  is	  important	  to	  answer	  this	  question	  because	  it	  
tells	  about	  the	  systemic	  problems	  encountered	  by	  the	  semiotic	  process	  used	  for	  checking	  the	  quality	  of	  
many	  sustainability	  indicators…”	  Mario	  Giampietro	  
“The	  pelagic	  fisherman	  in	  Norway,	  who	  are	  well	  organised	  and	  wealthy,	  agreed	  with	  scientists	  that	  
because	  of	  climate	  change	  the	  distribution	  of	  pelagic	  fish	  has	  expanded.	  But	  because	  of	  the	  expansion	  
the	  traditional	  survey	  cruises	  budgeted	  to	  survey	  just	  some	  areas,	  cannot	  absorb	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  
distribution,	  the	  fishermen	  suggested	  that	  the	  survey	  needs	  to	  be	  expanded.	  (…)	  	  as	  the	  government	  
would	  not	  finance	  this	  further,	  the	  fishermen	  agreed	  to	  pay	  for	  it,	  putting	  ½	  million	  EUR	  in	  January	  
[2015]	  to	  help	  the	  scientist	  to	  have	  a	  better	  survey	  coverage.	  When	  the	  survey	  was	  over,	  the	  lead	  
scientist	  oublically	  (in	  the	  newspaper)	  recognised	  it	  as	  the	  best	  survey	  they	  have	  ever	  had;	  the	  
collaboration	  had	  been	  great;	  unprecedented	  coverage	  of	  the	  stock.	  But	  then	  in	  February,	  the	  scientists	  
came	  out	  with	  a	  new	  stock	  estimate	  number,	  but	  keeping	  the	  data	  close	  to	  their	  chest.	  They	  said	  they	  
would	  not	  make	  the	  survey	  public,	  that	  there	  would	  be	  a	  relative	  estimate	  for	  the	  state	  of	  the	  stock	  
therefore	  not	  eligible	  for	  revising	  the	  quota.	  [So,	  the	  fishermen	  were	  unhappy	  and	  a	  great	  media	  
attention	  was	  given	  to	  this,	  about	  which	  the	  scientists	  responded	  very	  assertively].	  (…)	  The	  pelagic	  
industry	  is	  so	  convinced	  that	  the	  way	  they	  are	  doing	  science	  is	  wrong	  that	  they	  will	  finance	  the	  science	  
themselves.”	  Dorothy	  Dankel	  
Dorothy	  Dankel	  
“Monte-­‐Carlo	  simulation	  process	  is	  a	  non-­‐sense”,	  John	  Kay	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John	  Kay	  challenged	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  real	  model	  out	  there.	  Using	  two	  compelling	  examples	  
of	  models	  some	  use	  everyday	  (the	  London	  Tube	  map)	  and	  the	  WebTAG	  forecast	  model4	  he	  
has	  illustrated	  on	  one	  
hand	  the	  persistent	  idea	  
that	  models	  fit	  the	  
territory	  and	  on	  the	  other	  
hand	  the	  inability	  to	  have	  
the	  knowledge	  these	  
models	  assume.	  The	  
results	  often	  discredit	  of	  
the	  whole	  enterprise	  of	  
modelling.	  In	  his	  view,	  in	  
many	  of	  these	  models	  the	  
future	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  
essentially	  similar	  to	  the	  
present,	  when	  in	  the	  particular	  model	  he	  described	  with	  regards	  to	  driving	  patterns,	  it	  is	  
hard	  to	  have	  any	  idea	  about	  what	  the	  future	  is	  like.	  Also	  uncertainties	  within	  the	  model	  are	  
often	  ignored	  or	  dealt	  with	  in	  an	  unsatisfactory	  way	  –	  for	  example,	  how	  do	  we	  know	  
whether	  a	  particular	  concept	  or	  variable	  we	  use	  today	  will	  be	  at	  all	  relevant	  in	  50	  years?	  
Another	  group	  of	  problems	  arise	  in	  economics,	  for	  example	  use	  of	  “analogue	  economies”,	  
simplified	  assumptions	  such	  as	  the	  behavioural	  approaches	  that	  consider	  one	  agent	  as	  a	  
representative	  of	  all	  behaviours.	  All	  models	  impose	  an	  axiomatic	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  world.	  
Kay	  suggested	  that	  we	  follow	  Lyotard’s	  view	  that	  we	  need	  to	  move	  away	  from	  grand	  
narratives	  vs.	  little	  stories,	  i.e.,	  from	  grand	  models	  to	  models	  that	  are	  actually	  useful	  in	  
particular	  problems	  and	  are	  not	  useful	  for	  other	  purposes.	  He	  proposes	  using	  models	  in	  
different	  ways,	  i.e.,	  simpler	  models	  that	  identify	  key	  factors	  that	  influence	  assessment,	  
deciding	  at	  each	  stage	  if	  quantifications	  are	  really	  relevant	  not	  adding	  to	  confounding	  
arguments.	  Moreover,	  he	  argued	  that	  piecemeal	  assessment	  of	  individual	  components	  of	  
large	  projects	  is	  more	  useful	  than	  black	  box	  analysis	  for	  policy	  making.	  Finally,	  he	  suggested	  
we	  “abandon	  completely	  the	  search	  for	  standard	  templates	  and	  universal	  models”,	  
arguing	  that	  the	  belief	  that	  this	  is	  possible	  is	  a	  fundamental	  methodological	  misconception.	  
	  	  
Andrea	  Saltelli	  illustrated	  
the	  elements	  of	  crisis	  of	  trust	  
and	  quality	  in	  the	  current	  
scientific	  endeavour,	  focusing	  
on	  reproducibility	  -­‐	  in	  both	  
natural	  and	  social	  sciences,	  
and	  an	  increasingly	  
dysfunctional	  peer	  reviewing	  
processes.	  As	  noted	  by	  
scholars	  such	  as	  Ravetz	  
(1971)	  forty	  years	  ago	  and	  more	  recently	  Mirowski	  (2011;	  2013),	  science	  as	  a	  public	  good	  
has	  become	  a	  commodity	  that	  can	  be	  described	  as	  techno-­‐science.	  This	  has	  lost	  its	  original	  
ethos	  and	  quality.	  The	  present	  predicaments	  of	  science’s	  quality	  control	  mechanism	  cannot	  
be	  solved	  ‘from	  within’	  with	  technical	  fixes	  and	  better	  incentives.	  Saltelli	  called	  for	  more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  e.g.	  https://www.gov.uk/guidance/transport-­‐analysis-­‐guidance-­‐webtag	  
“If	  you	  ask	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  it	  [predictive	  models],	  then	  I	  think	  you	  need	  
to	  start	  with	  the	  basic	  concept	  from	  which	  it	  begins	  which	  is	  you	  are	  doing	  
an	  exercise	  essentially	  like	  the	  one	  NASA	  was	  undertaking	  and	  you	  ask	  
yourself	  suppose	  we	  knew	  everything	  we	  might	  want	  to	  know	  about	  the	  
system	  we	  are	  undertaking,	  what	  would	  be	  the	  information	  which	  we	  
would	  need	  in	  order	  to	  make	  that	  assessment?	  So,	  you	  imagine	  you	  know	  
everything	  you	  could	  possibly	  know	  about	  the	  world	  and	  then	  you	  could	  
construct	  a	  model	  on	  that	  basis;	  you	  then	  encounter	  the	  problem	  that	  you	  
hardly	  know	  any	  of	  that	  information	  so	  what	  do	  you	  do?	  You	  make	  it	  all	  
up.	  (…)	  [Several	  implications,	  namely]	  since	  most	  of	  the	  numbers	  are	  
invented	  you	  can	  usually	  select	  the	  invented	  numbers	  to	  get	  whatever	  
results	  you	  want.	  For	  example,	  for	  the	  project	  in	  the	  UK	  of	  constructing	  a	  
train	  high	  speed	  link	  between	  London	  and	  Birmingham.”	  John	  Kay	  
“What	  better	  way	  to	  express	  the	  crisis	  in	  trust	  than	  using	  the	  words	  
of	  the	  Pope?	  (…)	  	  This	  is	  a	  speech	  given	  to	  the	  Parliament	  in	  
Strasbourg	  in	  November	  of	  last	  year.	  	  If	  you	  look,	  there	  is	  an	  aspect	  of	  
these	  remarks	  where,	  at	  the	  beginning,	  we	  have	  lost	  the	  great	  ideals.	  	  
However,	  then	  the	  loss	  of	  trust	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  
institutions	  are	  perceived	  as	  aloof	  and	  are	  engaged	  in	  laying	  down	  
rules	  that	  are	  seen	  as	  insensitive	  to	  individual	  people,	  if	  not	  
downright	  harmful.	  	  The	  legitimate	  question	  is	  whether	  some	  or	  most	  
of	  these	  rules	  are	  the	  result	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  misplaced	  evidence	  for	  
policy.”	  Andrea	  Saltelli	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attention	  for	  the	  lessons	  of	  sociology	  of	  science	  (such	  as	  science	  and	  technology	  studies)	  and	  
for	  emerging	  forms	  of	  science	  as	  possible	  elements	  for	  a	  way	  ahead.	  
Evidence	  based	  policy	  needs	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  existing	  problems	  of	  science.	  Quoting	  
Lyotard	  (1979),	  Funtowicz	  (2006)	  and	  others,	  he	  argued	  against	  the	  prevailing	  demarcation	  
model	  that	  separates	  facts	  from	  values	  and	  science	  from	  policy.	  After	  reviewing	  some	  
egregious	  cases	  of	  error,	  abuse	  and	  misuse	  in	  modelling,	  Saltelli	  proposes	  a	  vigilant	  attitude	  
tot	  quantifications,	  including	  “sensitivity	  auditing”	  as	  a	  means	  to	  both	  construct	  and	  use	  
models	  and	  indicators	  for	  use	  in	  policy.	  	  
	  
	  
Zora	  Kovacic	  	  focused	  her	  talk	  
on	  quantitative	  evidence	  in	  policy	  
issues	  where	  there	  are	  great	  
uncertainties,	  offering	  three	  
contemporary	  case	  studies	  (GDP,	  
water,	  and	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  
2007-­‐08),	  which	  feature	  different	  
types	  of	  dissonance	  on	  narratives,	  
perceptions	  and	  representations.	  
She	  offered	  multi-­‐scale	  analysis	  as	  
a	  vantage	  point	  to	  discuss	  some	  of	  those	  dissonances.	  As	  she	  asserted,	  modelling	  indicators	  
implies	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  field	  of	  expertise	  that	  informs	  evidence	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  specific	  
disciplines	  as	  opposed	  to	  others,	  as	  well	  as	  representation	  of	  some	  narratives	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  of	  others.	  She	  proposed	  multi-­‐scale	  analysis	  is	  proposed	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  understand	  
what	  knowledge	  claims	  tell,	  to	  identify	  the	  limits	  of	  a	  representation	  and	  to	  identify	  
knowledge	  gaps	  when	  looking	  at	  evidence	  based	  policy	  making.	  Kovacic	  further	  offered	  
reflexivity	  as	  a	  tool	  where	  questions	  such	  as:	  who	  defines	  the	  relevant	  representation	  of	  an	  
issue?	  To	  what	  extent	  it	  is	  worth	  producing	  more	  accurate	  measurements	  to	  give	  better	  
advice	  to	  policy?	  Is	  what	  we	  are	  doing	  really	  useful?	  What	  are	  the	  normative	  components	  in	  




“George	  Box	  once	  said,	  “All	  models	  are	  wrong	  but	  some	  are	  
useful”.	  But	  before	  using	  these	  models,	  some	  questions	  
need	  to	  be	  asked.	  What	  makes	  a	  model	  useful?	  Who	  
defines	  the	  purpose	  and	  usefulness?	  	  One	  example	  is	  GDP,	  
which	  was	  conceived	  during	  WWII	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  
measuring	  productive	  activities	  in	  the	  economy,	  to	  
investigate	  if	  countries	  were	  capable	  of	  engaging	  in	  the	  war.	  
But	  is	  this	  model	  still	  useful?	  Does	  it	  make	  sense	  now,	  to	  
measure	  productive	  capacity	  in	  service	  economies?”	  Zora	  
Kovacic	  
“How	  does	  probability	  enter	  a	  scientific	  problem?	  It	  could	  be	  that	  the	  underlying	  physical	  phenomenon	  really	  
is	  random	  (e.g.	  radioactive	  decay,	  quantum	  mechanics);	  it	  could	  be	  that	  you	  deliberately	  introduced	  
randomness	  (e.g.,	  a	  deliberately	  randomised	  experiment,	  a	  random	  sample);	  it	  could	  be	  that	  you	  use	  
subjective	  probability	  to	  attempt	  to	  quantify	  personal	  uncertainty;	  or	  the	  probability	  could	  exist	  only	  within	  a	  
model	  invented	  to	  describe	  the	  phenomenon	  (metaphorical	  probability,	  e.g.,	  claiming	  that	  earthquakes	  
occur	  “as	  if”	  a	  casino	  game).	  When	  the	  probability	  comes	  from	  a	  model,	  one	  should	  ask	  whether	  the	  model	  
has	  been	  tested	  and	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  adequately	  accurate	  for	  the	  task.	  For	  instance,	  there	  aren’t	  enough	  
magnitude	  8	  earthquakes	  in	  a	  particular	  region	  to	  tell	  whether	  any	  model	  is	  useful.”	  Philip	  Stark	  	  
[with	  regards	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis],	  “the	  scale	  of	  analysis	  that	  is	  used	  to	  understand	  what	  was	  
happening	  at	  micro-­‐level	  does	  not	  explain	  what	  was	  happening	  at	  the	  macro-­‐level,	  the	  	  propagation	  of	  
risk	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  information	  caused	  by	  the	  pooling	  of	  many	  derivatives.	  On	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  
rational	  agent	  (profit	  maximisation	  agent)	  which	  according	  to	  micro-­‐economic	  theory	  is	  supposed	  to	  
lead	  to	  economic	  growth	  through	  the	  invisible	  hand	  of	  the	  market	  and	  if	  individual	  agents	  are	  doing	  Ok	  
this	  should	  result	  in	  growth	  for	  all,	  but	  in	  practice	  what	  we	  saw	  is	  that	  in	  the	  long	  term	  this	  led	  to	  
distribution	  of	  risk	  and	  systematic	  loss	  of	  information.	  At	  the	  macro-­‐level	  the	  story	  told	  was	  differently,	  
what	  we	  saw	  was	  that	  year	  after	  year	  the	  GDP	  was	  growing	  whilst	  we	  ended	  up	  in	  an	  economic	  crisis,	  
not	  being	  completely	  clear	  about	  what	  happened.	  So,	  in	  this	  case	  despite	  the	  rich	  knowledge	  basis,	  it	  
didn’t	  provide	  any	  quantitative	  information	  about	  what	  was	  going	  on,	  even	  if	  there	  were	  a	  lot	  of	  
numbers	  being	  produced.”	  Zora	  Kovacic	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Whilst	  there	  are	  meaningful	  ways	  to	  use	  probabilities,	  Philip	  Stark	  described	  a	  series	  of	  
serious	  misconceptions	  about	  probability,	  giving	  examples	  from	  actual	  applications	  that	  
underpin	  policy	  making.	  He	  described	  the	  process	  of	  “quantifauxcation”	  whereby	  
meaningless	  numbers	  are	  produced	  and	  then	  treated	  as	  if	  they	  had	  meaning	  merely	  by	  
virtue	  of	  being	  numerical;	  he	  claimed	  that	  this	  is	  a	  common	  source	  of	  numbers	  used	  as	  the	  
basis	  for	  policy	  decisions.	  Cost-­‐benefit	  analyses	  often	  assume	  that	  all	  costs	  can	  be	  put	  on	  a	  
common	  scale,	  whereas	  even	  common	  sense	  can	  assert	  that	  some	  are	  incommensurable	  -­‐	  
e.g.	  quantifying	  human	  life	  in	  dollars.	  But	  multi-­‐dimensional	  scales	  cannot	  always	  be	  well	  
ordered.	  Stark	  argued	  against	  claims	  that	  rationality	  requires	  quantitative	  cost-­‐benefit	  
analyses.	  Rather,	  if	  there	  is	  no	  rational	  basis	  for	  
the	  underlying	  numbers,	  how	  can	  a	  decision	  that	  
relies	  on	  the	  numbers	  be	  rational?	  Another	  
example	  of	  “quantifauxcation”	  is	  many	  activities	  
under	  risk	  analysis:	  What	  if	  probability	  doesn’t	  
apply	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  question,	  if	  the	  
consequences	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  one-­‐
dimensional	  scale,	  or	  if	  the	  consequences	  are	  not	  
known?	  	  
Another	  example	  of	  “quantifauxcation”	  is	  what	  Stark	  described	  as	  “Cargo	  cult	  confidence	  
intervals”,	  i.e.,	  when	  the	  formal	  calculations	  of	  confidence	  intervals	  are	  applied	  to	  samples	  
that	  are	  not	  random	  samples.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  common	  to	  use	  the	  mean	  and	  standard	  
deviation	  of	  an	  ad	  hoc	  collection	  of	  models	  or	  estimates	  to	  make	  a	  “confidence	  interval”	  or	  
“probability”	  statement	  –	  seen	  over	  and	  over,	  e.g.	  in	  IPCC	  reports.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  
issues	  of	  replicability,	  he	  suggested	  “preproducibility”,	  i.e.	  a	  description	  that	  includes	  those	  
things	  that	  we	  may	  not,	  with	  advantage,	  omit,	  which	  is	  a	  current	  problem	  in	  science.	  
Without	  describing	  the	  assumptions	  of	  the	  model,	  methodological	  procedures,	  etc.	  there	  is	  
just	  a	  story,	  not	  scientific	  evidence	  as	  its	  claims	  cannot	  be	  verified.	  
	   	  
“Quantifauxcation:	  Assign	  a	  
meaningless	  number,	  then	  pretend	  that,	  
since	  it’s	  quantitative,	  it’s	  meaningful.	  
[This]	  usually	  involves	  some	  
combination	  of	  data,	  pure	  invention,	  ad-­‐
hoc	  models,	  inappropriate	  use	  of	  
statistics	  and	  logical	  gaps.”	  Philip	  Stark	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Key	  Quality	  Issues	  
Through	  this	  workshop	  we	  have	  identified	  key	  quality	  issues	  that	  lead	  to,	  or	  result	  from,	  bad	  
practice	  and	  irresponsible	  use	  of	  digits	  in	  the	  scientific	  practices	  associated	  with	  policy	  
making.	  
	  
1.	  Insignificant	  digits.	  	  The	  workshop	  exposed	  a	  great	  number	  of	  examples	  that	  show	  that	  
there	  is	  indeed	  a	  serious	  problem.	  This	  becomes	  apparent	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  contexts:	  indicators	  
and	  models’	  assumptions;	  rhetoric	  concealed	  in	  the	  apparently	  bare	  number;	  the	  fabrication	  
of	  numbers	  in	  order	  to	  run	  otherwise	  un-­‐runnable	  models;	  indicators	  that	  are	  affected	  by	  
type	  3	  error,	  i.e.	  indicating	  irrelevant	  or	  confounding	  state	  of	  affairs;	  or	  phenomena	  
described	  at	  the	  workshop	  as	  “quantifauxcation”,	  “hypocognition”.	  The	  importance	  of	  
knowing	  who	  is	  generating	  those	  numbers	  and	  deciding	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  measured,	  for	  
what	  purpose	  and	  context,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  world-­‐views	  that	  are	  sustaining	  such	  numbers,	  calls	  
for	  urgent	  societal	  enquiry	  involving	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  stakeholders.	  	  	  
2.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  story	  telling:	  the	  workshop	  emphasised	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
story	  told	  and	  of	  the	  story	  tellers	  behind	  the	  numbers	  that	  are	  generated	  and	  used	  in	  policy	  
making.	  	  It	  emerged	  that	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  clarity	  about	  the	  implicit	  story	  behind	  the	  
numbers	  that	  are	  generated	  and	  used	  in	  policy	  making.	  	  Those	  background	  stories	  shape	  the	  
assumptions	  behind	  the	  models	  and	  statistical	  techniques,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  intended	  
rhetorical	  effects	  of	  apparently	  bare	  numbers.	  	  
3.	  A	  matter	  of	  institutional	  (dis)trust.	  The	  workshop	  identified	  striking	  examples	  where	  
institutions’	  credibility	  and	  legitimacy	  are	  put	  at	  risk	  because	  of	  poor	  practices	  in	  the	  
generation,	  use	  and	  communication,	  or	  even	  the	  concealment,	  of	  quantitative	  information.	  	  
These	  practices	  put	  institutional	  credibility	  and	  citizen	  trust	  in	  institutions	  in	  jeopardy,	  
adding	  to	  the	  on-­‐going	  crisis	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  policy-­‐relevant	  science	  affairs.	  	  
4.	  Discrediting	  science.	  Further	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  credibility	  in	  institutions	  that	  generate	  and	  
use	  numbers	  in	  the	  name	  of	  science,	  the	  discrediting	  eventually	  also	  affects	  the	  scientific	  
endeavour	  as	  a	  whole,	  becoming	  generalised	  to	  realms	  where	  digital	  information	  could	  in	  
principle	  be	  significant.	  This	  tendency	  is	  very	  visible	  in	  the	  way	  that	  uncertainties	  are	  played	  
out	  at	  policy	  level.	  
5.	  In	  the	  matters	  of	  concern,	  an	  isolated	  individual	  cannot	  decide	  what	  is	  societally	  relevant	  
and	  therefore	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  counted.	  	  The	  workshop	  emphasized	  quite	  strongly	  the	  need	  
for	  more	  broadly	  based	  societal	  research	  when	  numbers	  are	  involved.	  What	  is	  relevant?	  
What	  is	  significant?	  These	  are	  questions	  that	  cannot	  be	  left	  to	  science	  or	  policy	  elites	  alone;	  
in	  fact	  reasoning	  with	  numbers	  for	  policy	  without	  broad	  social	  engagement	  is	  close	  to	  an	  
oxymoron.	  
6.	  Throughout	  the	  workshop	  a	  number	  of	  reflexivity	  tools	  have	  been	  offered	  to	  ensure	  the	  
development	  of	  craft	  skills	  with	  numbers.	  	  This	  would	  enable	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  quality	  
(including	  the	  significance)	  of	  numbers	  and	  digits	  produced	  to	  underpin	  policy	  and	  other	  
types	  of	  action.	  Frameworks	  and	  tools	  have	  been	  proposed	  such	  as:	  tools	  that	  investigate	  
“Do	  you	  need	  a	  number	  to	  see	  that	  it	  is	  a	  bad	  idea	  to	  put	  a	  nuclear	  site	  close	  to	  a	  major	  
fault?”	  Mario	  Giampietro	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processes	  of	  confounding	  and	  hypocognition,	  including	  quantitative	  story	  telling	  and	  
sensitivity	  auditing;	  working	  deliberately	  within	  imperfections	  as	  in	  post-­‐normal	  science	  
frameworks	  and	  the	  NUSAP	  methodology;	  preproducibility	  to	  avoid	  statistical	  
misconceptions	  and	  ‘quantifauxcation’;	  ensuring	  social	  robustness	  by	  making	  use	  of	  more	  
social	  research	  namely	  dialogue	  and	  deliberation	  methods	  about	  the	  matters	  of	  concern.	  
7.	  Reinforcing	  awareness.	  Through	  a	  variety	  of	  examples,	  the	  workshop	  showed	  standard	  
problems	  of	  incompetence	  that	  affect	  the	  way	  numbers	  are	  produced	  and	  subsequently	  
deployed:	  incompetent	  application	  of	  statistics;	  de-­‐contextualisation	  of	  models	  and	  
indicators	  (being	  used	  outside	  of	  their	  field	  of	  applicability,	  inappropriate	  generalisations,	  
compression	  of	  scales,	  etc.);	  ignoring	  of	  epistemic	  and	  social	  uncertainties.	  	  The	  workshop	  
suggested	  that	  merely	  raising	  awareness	  of	  such	  errors	  is	  probably	  insufficient.	  	  It	  needs	  to	  
be	  reinforced	  not	  only	  at	  the	  scientific	  level,	  but	  also	  at	  institutional	  level.	  Quality	  assurance	  
is	  a	  collective	  endeavour	  for	  the	  whole	  community	  including	  stakeholders,	  not	  to	  be	  left	  to	  
specialist	  groups.	  
8.	  Crisis	  and	  reform.	  	  This	  technically	  oriented	  workshop	  took	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  
general	  and	  intensifying	  crisis	  in	  the	  quality	  and	  trustworthiness	  of	  policy	  relevant	  science,	  
and	  hence	  in	  the	  responsibility	  of	  those	  who	  conduct	  and	  manage	  it.	  	  Before	  the	  workshop	  
took	  place	  there	  was	  an	  exposure	  of	  decades	  of	  misconceived	  advice	  on	  nutrition,	  based	  on	  
the	  ‘lipid	  hypothesis’	  starting	  with	  a	  paradigm-­‐setting	  but	  deeply	  flawed	  ‘seven	  nations	  
study’	  of	  dietary	  fat	  and	  heart	  disease.	  	  Since	  the	  workshop	  the	  world	  has	  learned	  how	  
scientific	  studies	  of	  diesel	  engine	  emissions	  were	  deliberately	  and	  systematically	  perverted	  
by	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  reputable	  manufacturers.	  The	  scandal	  was	  not	  exposed	  by	  the	  
official	  regulators	  but	  by	  an	  ‘extended	  peer’,	  an	  independent	  testing	  agency.	  Although	  
sophisticated	  mathematical	  methods	  were	  not	  deployed	  in	  either	  of	  those	  fateful	  
investigations,	  the	  two	  issues	  of	  competence	  and	  integrity	  are	  closely	  related.	  	  If	  so	  much	  of	  
policy-­‐relevant	  mathematical	  science	  is	  shot	  through	  with	  confusion	  and	  error,	  then	  the	  





Those	  who	  expose	  and	  analyse	  crises	  like	  these	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  considered	  as	  fomenters	  
of	  cynicism	  and	  despair.	  	  But	  they	  are	  necessary	  for	  breaking	  the	  barriers	  of	  inertia,	  
complacency	  and	  protectionism,	  which	  inhibit	  those	  constructive	  responses	  and	  reforms	  
which,	  however	  difficult	  and	  painful,	  will	  be	  essential	  to	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  activity	  in	  a	  
recognisable	  form.	  	  Those	  measures	  will	  arise	  in	  large	  part	  internally,	  from	  practitioners	  who	  
want	  to	  do	  an	  honest	  and	  competent	  job;	  and	  there	  have	  already	  been	  many	  initiatives	  for	  
restoring	  research	  integrity	  in	  one	  aspect	  or	  another.	  	  These	  efforts	  will	  benefit	  from	  
complementary	  initiatives	  promoted	  by	  people	  and	  institutions	  outside	  the	  traditionally	  
defined	  world	  of	  science.	  	  Citizens	  have	  a	  right	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  work,	  since	  misapplied	  
advice	  and	  inappropriate	  regulatory	  measures	  adversely	  affect	  citizens	  in	  their	  ordinary	  
lives.	  	  Wherever	  there	  are	  hazards	  and	  pollution	  created	  by	  science-­‐based	  industry,	  the	  
‘science	  of	  bads’	  is	  deployed,	  with	  structures	  of	  resources	  and	  incentives,	  and	  criteria	  of	  
quality,	  that	  are	  like	  mirror-­‐opposites	  to	  those	  of	  the	  sciences	  of	  the	  discovery	  of	  knowledge	  
and	  the	  production	  of	  goods.	  	  In	  such	  situations,	  the	  extended	  peer	  communities	  of	  citizens	  
can	  be	  crucial	  in	  creating	  a	  dialogue.	  They	  can	  open	  up	  issues	  for	  discussion	  and	  action,	  or	  
scrutinise	  methodologies	  with	  the	  questions	  ‘what-­‐if?’,	  ‘what-­‐about?’	  and	  ‘why?’,	  or	  even	  
exhume	  uncomfortable	  knowledge.	  	  Such	  critical	  inquiry	  happens	  routinely	  within	  the	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research	  communities	  in	  healthy	  fields;	  because	  of	  the	  special	  character	  of	  the	  science	  of	  
bads	  of	  policy	  relevant	  sciences,	  these	  external	  stimulants	  have	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play.	  
Returning	  to	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  workshop,	  if	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  prevalence	  of	  insignificant	  digits	  
in	  the	  quantitative	  policy	  related	  sciences,	  then	  the	  meaning	  of	  this	  less	  than	  perfect	  state	  of	  
affairs	  will	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  legitimate	  concern	  for	  citizens.	  	  Because	  of	  the	  highly	  technical	  
nature	  of	  the	  material,	  their	  contribution	  will	  be	  less	  broadly	  based	  than	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
pollution	  studies.	  	  The	  involved	  citizens	  may	  well	  include	  highly	  trained	  specialists,	  who	  find	  
themselves	  independent	  of	  the	  interests	  that	  are	  promoting	  or	  protecting	  an	  objectionable	  
situation.	  	  This	  already	  happens	  in	  disputes	  over	  planning	  or	  environmental	  policy,	  and	  in	  
some	  places	  the	  processes	  are	  highly	  institutionalised,	  with	  ‘stakeholders’	  given	  formal	  
recognition	  and	  even	  government	  support.	  	  The	  assumption	  that	  ‘scientists’	  (defined	  by	  
qualifications	  and	  employment)	  have	  a	  monopoly	  of	  relevant	  scientific	  knowledge	  now	  
belongs	  to	  a	  bygone	  age.	  
With	  an	  appreciation	  of	  this	  broader	  context,	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
JRC’s	  promotion	  of	  the	  two	  workshops	  in	  June.	  	  The	  later	  workshop	  focused	  on	  an	  issue	  
which	  is	  very	  likely	  to	  become	  salient	  in	  the	  near	  future:	  	  the	  challenge	  of	  quality	  in	  DIY	  
science.	  	  We	  chose	  the	  term	  ‘DIY’	  rather	  than	  ‘citizen’	  in	  order	  to	  emphasise	  the	  mode	  of	  
production,	  rather	  than	  the	  social	  location,	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  activity.	  	  The	  technology	  of	  
production	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  is	  being	  transformed,	  really	  as	  a	  new	  industrial	  revolution	  
but	  occurring	  at	  breakneck	  speed	  compared	  to	  the	  original.	  	  Although	  still	  small	  and	  
marginal,	  it	  is	  already	  affecting	  policy	  processes	  and	  mainstream	  science	  and	  technology	  in	  a	  
variety	  of	  ways.	  	  The	  challenge	  is	  easily	  understood,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  discussions	  at	  the	  
‘significant	  digits’	  workshop:	  	  if	  mainstream	  science,	  with	  all	  its	  traditions	  and	  institutions	  of	  
quality	  assurance,	  is	  itself	  in	  a	  crisis	  of	  quality,	  what	  hope	  is	  there	  that	  DIY	  science,	  
essentially	  anarchic,	  will	  solve	  those	  same	  problems	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  time	  for	  learning	  and	  
of	  institutions	  for	  social	  control?	  	  There	  is	  no	  easy	  answer,	  of	  course;	  but	  we	  believe	  that	  
even	  to	  pose	  the	  problem	  for	  public	  discussion	  is	  important	  for	  creating	  the	  conditions	  
under	  which	  it	  can	  be	  managed.	  
All	  this	  is	  part	  of	  a	  very	  broad	  movement	  for	  bringing	  science	  into	  democratic	  society,	  which	  
now	  enjoys	  support	  from	  leading	  institutions	  in	  Europe	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  There	  will	  be	  huge	  
problems	  to	  be	  solved,	  and	  doubtless	  a	  full	  ration	  of	  errors	  and	  failures.	  	  But	  out	  of	  this	  
process	  there	  may	  well	  be	  created	  a	  new	  sort	  of	  scientific	  practice,	  with	  renewed	  vigour,	  
creativity	  and	  morale.	  	  It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  predict	  its	  form,	  and	  how	  the	  new	  tasks	  of	  
governance	  will	  be	  accomplished.	  	  But	  the	  present	  crisis	  can	  indeed	  become	  a	  turning	  point,	  
analogous	  to	  the	  original	  scientific	  revolution	  out	  of	  which	  so	  much	  of	  the	  modern	  world	  
came	  to	  be.	  	  In	  organising	  these	  two	  workshops	  of	  reflection	  on	  the	  challenges	  of	  the	  
present	  and	  future,	  the	  JRC	  has	  made	  a	  valuable	  contribution	  to	  the	  process.	  
	  
	  
At	  the	  JRC	  
Many	  problems	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  digits,	  craft	  skills	  with	  numbers,	  deliberate	  and	  naïf	  
misuse	  of	  numbers,	  etc.	  have	  been	  subject	  of	  different	  expert	  workshops	  at	  the	  JRC.	  The	  
increasing	  scrutiny	  from	  extended	  peer	  communities	  who	  contribute	  extended	  facts	  and	  
others	  way	  of	  knowing	  have	  also	  been	  reviewed.	  The	  JRC	  could	  continue	  its	  job	  of	  
knowledge	  quality	  assurance	  not	  only	  through	  effecting	  in-­‐house	  practices	  that	  take	  stock	  of	  
these	  defects	  and	  offer	  remedies,	  but	  also	  to	  engage	  in	  training.	  	  It	  has	  the	  responsibility	  for	  
such	  activity,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  boundary	  institution	  whose	  spheres	  of	  operation	  are	  at	  the	  
intersection	  of	  science	  and	  policy.	  The	  analysis	  of	  bad	  practices	  is	  useful	  but	  not	  enough,	  and	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it	  may	  indeed	  eventually	  become	  counterproductive.	  	  Training	  at	  different	  levels	  of	  
operation	  at	  the	  European	  Commission	  (scientific	  and	  policy	  officers	  alike)	  is	  an	  option	  to	  be	  
considered.	  	  We	  suggest	  that	  an	  extensive	  embedding	  of	  the	  users	  and	  trainers	  of	  the	  JRC	  
reflexivity	  tools	  in	  its	  regular	  work	  would	  provide	  a	  great	  service	  to	  the	  European	  policies	  it	  
supports,	  and	  also	  to	  the	  policy	  process	  in	  Europe	  and	  worldwide.	  This	  work	  could	  then	  be	  
extended	  outside,	  to	  groups	  variously	  known	  as	  extended	  peer	  community,	  stakeholders,	  
citizens	  or	  DIY	  scientists.	  	  Nothing	  would	  make	  a	  greater	  direct	  contribution	  to	  the	  health	  
and	  vitality	  of	  the	  emerging	  peoples’	  science,	  than	  such	  an	  extended	  educational	  
programme	  in	  awareness	  and	  quality.	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Significant	  Digits:	  Opening	  
Vladimír Šucha  
European Commission, Director General of DG Joint Research Centre, 
Brussels, BE 
Director	  General	  Vladimír	  Šucha	  will	  introduce	  the	  workshop,	  outlining	  the	  relevance	  
of	  this	  endeavour	  in	  the	  broader	  context	  of	  the	  DG	  Joint	  Research	  Centre’s	  work	  and	  
its	  commitment	  to	  quality	  scientific	  advice	  to	  policy,	  viz	  à	  viz	  and	  with	  special	  
relevance	  to	  the	  new	  regulations	  and	  advice	  frameworks	  recently	  proposed	  by	  the	  
European	  Commission.	  	  
	  
	  
The	  Significance	  of	  Digits	  
Jerome Ravetz 
Institute for Science, Innovation and Society, Univ. of Oxford, UK 
Andrea	  Saltelli	  and	  Mario	  Giampietro6	  have	  shown	  us	  how	  to	  solve	  the	  crisis	  of	  
‘evidence-­‐based’	  policy,	  through	  an	  enriched	  conception	  of	  quality	  of	  science.	  	  Here	  I	  
would	  like	  to	  use	  my	  historical	  perspective	  to	  suggest	  how	  the	  problem	  came	  to	  be.	  	  
Its	  origins	  lie	  in	  a	  certain	  conception	  of	  knowledge,	  which	  can	  be	  summed	  up	  as	  a	  
faith	  in	  digits	  as	  nuggets	  of	  truth.	  	  Since	  this	  is	  so	  deep	  in	  our	  modern	  scientific	  
culture	  as	  to	  pass	  unnoticed,	  its	  exposure	  and	  correction	  will	  not	  be	  a	  quick	  or	  
straightforward	  process.	  	  But	  we	  must	  start	  somewhere,	  and	  here	  we	  are.	  
The	  existence	  of	  a	  crisis	  is	  beyond	  doubt.	  	  Economics,	  the	  king	  of	  the	  sciences	  of	  
society,	  has	  been	  exposed	  as	  vacuous	  in	  its	  main	  function,	  namely	  explaining	  and	  
helping	  to	  guide	  the	  running	  of	  the	  economy.	  	  And	  economics	  has	  long	  prided	  itself	  
on	  being	  the	  physics	  of	  society.	  	  In	  this	  it	  has	  ignored	  the	  actual	  state	  of	  physics	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  full	  agenda	  is	  available	  from:	  
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC96441/kjna27387enn.pdf	  
6	  See	  The	  fallacy	  of	  evidence	  based	  policy	  –	  Available	  at:	  
http://www.andreasaltelli.eu/file/repository/PaperDraftPolicyCartesianDream_16c.pdf	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the	  last	  century,	  riven	  by	  uncertainty	  and	  paradox.	  	  For	  economists,	  and	  all	  the	  
practitioners	  of	  social	  would-­‐be	  technologies	  who	  have	  imitated	  it,	  the	  faith	  was	  
simple.	  	  Given	  the	  reliance	  on	  numerical	  data	  and	  mathematical	  methods,	  what	  
could	  possibly	  go	  wrong?	  	  The	  answer	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  ‘everything’.	  
This	  delusionary	  faith	  has	  complex	  roots,	  in	  traditions	  of	  philosophical	  thought	  and	  
social	  practice.	  	  Here	  I	  focus	  on	  digits,	  as	  a	  core	  element	  and	  symptom	  of	  the	  
pathology.	  	  Other	  colleagues	  here	  have	  analysed	  the	  misuse	  and	  abuse	  of	  numerical	  
information	  at	  great	  depth.	  	  For	  brevity	  would	  like	  to	  use	  just	  two	  examples	  of	  the	  
unnoticed,	  or	  rather	  suppressed,	  contradictions	  in	  numerical	  information.	  	  	  
One	  is	  a	  variant	  on	  the	  classic	  ‘fossils	  joke’,	  where	  we	  consider	  the	  calculation:	  	  
65,000,000	  –	  3	  =	  64,999,997.	  	  This	  illustrates	  the	  ambiguity	  in	  the	  zero,	  functioning	  
as	  either	  counter	  or	  filler,	  and	  its	  meaning	  depending	  on	  context.	  	  Thus	  even	  in	  
digital	  information	  semantics	  sometimes	  dominates	  over	  syntax.	  	  Who	  knew	  that?	  	  
The	  other	  is	  the	  question,	  how	  many	  significant	  digits	  should	  we	  use	  in	  expressing	  an	  
‘error-­‐bar’?	  Is	  it	  really	  meaningful	  to	  say	  that	  we	  know	  that	  (say)	  the	  95%	  upper	  limit	  
of	  probability	  of	  an	  estimate	  is	  3.65	  and	  not	  3.64	  or	  3.66?	  	  If	  not,	  is	  there	  a	  clear	  
meaning	  there	  at	  all?	  	  My	  point	  is	  that	  a	  practice	  that	  depends	  on	  the	  concealment	  
of	  its	  confusions	  and	  contradictions	  will	  be	  particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  misuse	  and	  
abuse.	  	  I	  opened	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  ‘Obscurities	  at	  the	  
Foundations	  of	  Theoretical	  Science’	  in	  my	  earlier	  book.	  
I	  offer	  two	  historical	  parallels.	  	  Descartes’	  classic	  denunciation	  of	  humanist	  teaching	  
on	  ethics,	  as	  “towering	  and	  magnificent	  palaces	  with	  no	  better	  foundation	  than	  sand	  
and	  mud”	  might	  now	  become	  applied	  to	  the	  mathematical	  policy	  sciences.	  	  And	  the	  
understanding	  and	  practice	  of	  scripture-­‐based	  religion	  in	  the	  West	  was	  transformed	  
in	  modern	  times	  by	  the	  critical	  study	  of	  its	  sources.	  	  Will	  this	  present	  crisis	  provide	  
the	  opportunity	  for	  science	  to	  reflect	  and	  catch	  up?	  
Since	  so	  many	  policy	  issues	  now	  involve	  quantities	  with	  ‘not	  even	  one	  significant	  
digit’,	  we	  need	  an	  appropriate	  new	  arithmetical	  language,	  based	  on	  ‘soft	  numbers’	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On	  the	  extinction	  of	  craft	  skills	  with	  numbers:	  the	  case	  
of	  "Overall,	  7.9%	  of	  species	  are	  predicted	  to	  become	  
extinct	  from	  climate	  change"	  
Jeroen Van Der Sluijs 
Centre for the Study of the Sciences & the Humanities, University of Bergen, 
Norway 
Since	  the	  establishment	  in	  the	  1980s	  of	  science-­‐policy	  interfaces	  around	  
anthropogenic	  climate	  change	  attempts	  to	  quantify	  climate	  risks	  have	  produced	  
various	  “magic	  numbers”.	  The	  classic	  example	  is	  the	  1.5-­‐4.5	  °C	  range	  for	  the	  Earth’s	  
climate	  sensitivity.	  Such	  numbers	  are	  produced	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  and	  within	  a	  
particular	  context	  and	  are	  conditioned	  on	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  assumptions	  covering	  a	  
wide	  range	  of	  scientific	  statuses	  ranging	  from	  crude	  speculation	  to	  well	  established	  
knowledge.	  Once	  thrown	  over	  the	  disciplinary	  fence,	  important	  caveats	  tend	  to	  be	  
ignored,	  uncertainties	  compressed	  and	  numbers	  used	  at	  face	  value.	  Poor	  practice	  in	  
communication	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  what	  Jerome	  Ravetz	  calls	  “craft	  skills	  
with	  numbers”	  has	  created	  a	  host	  of	  misunderstandings	  and	  miscommunication	  in	  
quantitative	  information	  on	  climate	  change	  at	  the	  science	  policy	  and	  science	  society	  
interfaces.	  This	  paper	  analyses	  the	  case	  of	  quantification	  of	  the	  risk	  that	  climate	  
change	  poses	  to	  biodiversity.	  In	  2004,	  Thomas	  et	  al.	  (doi:10.1038/nature02121)	  were	  
the	  first	  to	  quantify	  extinction	  risks	  from	  climate	  change.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  highly	  
aggregated	  species-­‐area	  relationship	  model	  and	  climate	  projections	  of	  habitat	  loss,	  
they	  predicted	  that	  by	  2050	  “15–37%	  of	  species	  in	  our	  sample	  of	  regions	  and	  taxa	  
will	  be	  ‘committed	  to	  extinction’.”.	  Recently,	  based	  on	  a	  meta-­‐analysis,	  Urban	  (2015	  
doi:10.1126/science.aaa4984	  )	  concluded	  that	  “overall,	  7.9%	  of	  species	  are	  predicted	  
to	  become	  extinct	  from	  climate	  change”.	  This	  paper	  will	  critically	  reflect	  on	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  number	  “7.9%”	  and	  discuss	  the	  two	  papers	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  
craft	  skills	  with	  numbers	  and	  good	  practice	  in	  uncertainty	  communication.	  
	  
	  
Quantitative	  story	  telling	  as	  a	  therapy	  for	  hypocognition	  
Mario Giampietro  
Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA) -Universitat Autonoma de 
Barcelona, Spain 
Numbers	  in	  isolation	  do	  not	  carry	  meaning;	  they	  have	  to	  be	  always	  contextualised	  
(examples	  of	  blunders	  and	  problematic	  formalizations	  using	  indicators).	  Numbers	  do	  
not	  carry	  enough	  information	  for	  generating	  a	  robust	  integrated	  assessment	  -­‐	  you	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need	  vectors	  and	  matrices	  (data	  arrays)	  and	  grammars	  in	  order	  to	  transfer	  
information	  across	  levels	  and	  dimensions.	  	  Especially	  important	  is	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  
distinction	  between	  information	  referring	  to	  types	  and	  information	  referring	  to	  
special	  instances.	  	  
When	  dealing	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  complex	  systems	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  adopt	  a	  
contextualisation	  "one	  size	  fits	  all"	  so,	  the	  more	  we	  try	  to	  formalise	  complex	  
problems,	  the	  more	  we	  generate	  hypocognition.	  
The	  way	  out	  is	  an	  integration	  of	  different	  quantitative	  types	  of	  analysis	  properly	  
contextualized	  that	  have	  to	  be	  handled	  simultaneously	  using	  semantic	  relations.	  But	  
if	  one	  decides	  to	  adopt	  this	  solution	  one	  has	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  the	  
choice	  of	  your	  stories.	  The	  talk	  concludes	  with	  examples	  of	  quantitative	  story-­‐telling	  
information	  systems.	  	  	  
Fisheries	  quota	  advice	  for	  management:	  Significant	  
scripts	  and	  significant	  digits	  
Dorothy J. Dankel 
Centre for the Study of the Sciences & the Humanities, University of Bergen, 
Norway 
The	  oldest	  and	  most	  prominent	  of	  scientific	  institutions	  in	  Europe	  with	  a	  mandate	  to	  
provide	  advice	  on	  ecosystem-­‐based	  management	  of	  the	  Ocean	  is	  the	  International	  
Council	  for	  the	  Exploration	  of	  the	  Sea	  (ICES).	  ICES	  is	  made	  up	  of	  over	  1000	  scientists	  
who	  are	  active	  in	  annual	  Expert	  Groups	  and	  produce	  annual	  reports	  with	  annual	  
advice	  delivered	  as	  the	  “Total	  Allowable	  Catch”	  (TAC).	  The	  well-­‐oiled	  TAC-­‐machine	  
does	  its	  job	  as	  dictated	  by	  ICES’	  clients,	  but	  here	  I	  problematize	  the	  perception	  that	  
TAC	  advice	  should	  be	  given	  as	  a	  single	  number.	  Often,	  a	  single	  and	  conclusive	  
scientific	  answer	  will	  never	  be	  available	  for	  complex	  systems	  such	  as	  fisheries	  and	  
marine	  ecosystems.	  In	  such	  cases,	  more	  research	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  less	  uncertainty,	  
but	  can	  lead	  instead	  to	  unforeseen	  complexities	  (Van	  der	  Sluijs	  et	  al.,	  2005a,	  
2005b,	  2010).	  Values	  are	  in	  dispute	  when	  the	  potential	  impacts	  of	  decisions	  based	  
on	  uncertain	  models	  have	  very	  large	  biological	  and/or	  social	  consequences.	  Among	  
ICES’	  goals	  in	  its	  new	  Strategic	  Plan	  (2014-­‐2018)	  is	  increased	  transparency	  and	  better	  
and	  increased	  dialogue	  with	  stakeholders,	  however	  we	  still	  observe	  stakeholder	  
reluctance	  to	  develop	  alternative	  ways	  of	  delivering	  advice.	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  use	  the	  
term	  “scripts”	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  Goffmann	  (Giddens,	  1998)	  to	  describe	  the	  changing	  
roles	  of	  ICES	  scientists	  the	  last	  decade.	  We	  observe	  a	  shift	  from	  passive	  scientific	  
reviews	  to	  active	  science	  that	  increasingly	  is	  in	  dialogue	  with	  stakeholders	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  new	  management	  strategies.	  However,	  the	  plurality	  of	  roles	  of	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single	  scientists	  is	  not	  arbitrary,	  and	  I	  argue	  that	  scripts	  and	  digits	  are	  inevitably	  
intertwined.	  	  I	  conclude	  by	  introducing	  a	  method,	  the	  “Confidence	  Level	  Harvest	  
Control	  Rule”	  for	  fisheries	  advice	  that	  potentially	  remedies	  both	  the	  script-­‐juggling	  
problem	  of	  scientists	  and	  the	  significant	  digit/significant	  model	  problem	  for	  society.	  
“Roles	  specify	  generalized	  expectations	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  has	  more	  or	  less	  
closely	  to	  conform	  when	  in	  a	  particular	  situated	  context.	  […].	  The	  self	  consists	  in	  an	  
awareness	  of	  identity	  which	  simultaneously	  transcends	  specific	  roles	  and	  provides	  an	  
integrating	  means	  of	  relating	  them	  to	  personal	  biography:	  and	  a	  set	  of	  dispositions	  
for	  managing	  the	  transactions	  between	  motives	  and	  the	  expectations	  ‘scripted’	  by	  
particular	  roles”	  
(Giddens,	  1988)	  [p.	  258-­‐259).	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Pay	  no	  attention	  to	  the	  model	  behind	  the	  curtain	  
Philip B. Stark 
Univ. of California, Berkeley, USA 
Watch	  me	  pull	  a	  probability	  out	  of	  my	  model	  ...	  Presto!	  Typical	  attempts	  to	  quantify	  
risk	  for	  policy	  makers	  involve	  inventing	  a	  stochastic	  model	  for	  a	  phenomenon;	  fitting	  
some	  parameters	  in	  that	  model	  to	  data;	  then	  declaring	  that	  features	  of	  the	  fitted	  
model,	  called	  "probabilities"	  within	  the	  model,	  magically	  apply	  to	  the	  real	  world.	  
Pulling	  this	  probability	  rabbit	  from	  the	  analyst's	  hat	  generally	  involves	  several	  
statistical	  and	  philosophical	  sleights	  of	  hand:	  confusing	  the	  map	  (the	  model)	  with	  the	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territory	  (the	  phenomenon),	  confusing	  rates	  with	  probabilities,	  and	  distracting	  
attention	  from	  the	  moment	  that	  probability	  entered	  the	  hat	  (i.e.,	  the	  moment	  the	  
stochastic	  model	  was	  assumed	  to	  have	  generated	  the	  data).	  	  Bedazzling	  the	  
onlookers	  with	  a	  sparkly	  array	  of	  Greek	  symbols,	  heroic	  high-­‐performance	  
computing,	  and	  superficial	  attempts	  to	  quantify	  the	  uncertainty	  renders	  the	  show	  all	  
the	  more	  dramatic.	  	  	  
 
 
The	  simplification	  of	  complexity:	  challenges	  of	  
sustainability	  science	  for	  governance	  
Zora Kovavic 
Institut de Ciència i Tecnologia Ambientals (ICTA) - Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona, Spain 
The	   criticism	   to	   evidence	   based	   policy	   is	   a	   criticism	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   science	   can	  
provide	  policy	  makers	  with	  all	  the	  information	  that	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  decide	  for	  
the	  common	  good	  (Funtowicz	  and	  Strand	  2007).	  The	  assumption	  behind	  this	  model	  
of	   science-­‐policy	   is	   that	   (1)	   scientific	   information	   is	   a	   faithful	   representation	   of	  
reality,	  whose	   interpretation	  and	  use	  are	  unequivocal,	  and	  that	  (2)	  policy	  decisions	  
are	  based	  on	  the	  scientific	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  scientific	  community.	  	  
The	   first	   assumption	   is	   addressed	   by	   looking	   at	   instances	   of	   scientific	   information	  
used	  to	  discuss	  policies.	  Based	  on	  the	  case	  of	  the	  indicators	  produced	  following	  the	  
Beyond	   GDP	   Conference	   of	   2007	   and	   of	   the	   scientific	   evidence	   used	   in	   water	  
management	  in	  Israel,	  I	  will	  give	  examples	  of	  the	  high	  level	  of	  ambiguity	  associated	  
with	  scientific	  information	  and	  of	  the	  multiple	  representations	  of	  the	  same	  problem	  
that	   can	  be	  produced	  by	  using	  different	   scales	  of	  analysis,	  different	  narratives	  and	  
different	  time	  frames.	  The	  plurality	  of	  representations	  and	  perspectives	  that	  can	  be	  
found	   in	  science	  suggest	   that	  scientific	   information	  reflects	   the	  normative	  stand	  of	  
the	   analyst	   in	   relation	   to	   what	   is	   to	   be	   considered	   relevant	   in	   the	   framing	   of	   a	  
problem	  –	  rather	  than	  a	  faithful	  representation	  of	  reality.	  
The	  second	  assumption	  is	  addressed	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  management	  of	  the	  financial	  
crisis	  of	  2008.	   In	  this	  case,	  policies	  seem	  to	  be	   irresponsive	  to	  the	   improvement	  of	  
models,	   to	  more	   refined	   information,	   and	   to	  more	   data.	   In	   this	   situation,	   to	  what	  
extent	   is	   it	   worth	   producing	   more	   accurate	   measurements,	   more	   quantitative	  
information,	  and	  more	  indicators?	  	  
I	   argue	   that	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   complexity	   can	   provide	   some	   of	   the	   tools	  
needed	  to	  deal	  with	  uncertainty	  and	  pluralism.	  Complexity	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  systematic	  
study	   of	   the	   way	   in	   which	   different	   perspectives	   are	   expressed	   in	   different	   pre-­‐
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analytical	   choices	   and	   in	   the	   resulting	   non-­‐equivalent	   representations	   of	   the	   same	  
problem.	   Complexity	   thus	   offers	   a	   way	   to	   assess	   the	   usefulness	   of	   the	   scientific	  
information	  used	  in	  different	  policy	  contexts.	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Evidence	  based	  policy:	  handle	  with	  care	  
Andrea Saltelli 
Centre for the Study of the Sciences & the Humanities, University of Bergen, 
Norway 
The	  use	  of	  science	  for	  policy	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  a	  perfect	  storm	  generated	  by	  the	  
insurgence	  of	  several	  concurrent	  crises:	  of	  science,	  of	  trust,	  of	  sustainability.	  The	  
prevailing	  modern	  positivistic	  model	  of	  science	  for	  policy,	  known	  as	  ‘evidence	  based	  
policy’,	  is	  based	  on	  dramatic	  simplifications	  and	  compressions	  of	  available	  
perceptions	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  and	  possible	  explanations	  (hypocognition).	  
Therefore	  this	  model	  can	  result	  in	  seriously	  flawed	  prescriptions.	  
The	  primacy	  of	  science	  to	  adjudicate	  political	  issues	  must	  pass	  through	  a	  serious	  
assessment	  of	  the	  level	  of	  maturity	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  various	  disciplines.	  	  The	  
solution	  implies	  abandoning	  dreams	  of	  prediction,	  control	  and	  optimization	  obtained	  
by	  relying	  on	  a	  limited	  set	  of	  simplified	  narratives	  to	  define	  a	  problem	  to	  be	  dealt	  
with	  and	  move	  instead	  to	  an	  open	  exploration	  of	  a	  broader	  set	  of	  plausible	  and	  
relevant	  stories.	  	  
We	  make	  examples	  of	  instrumental	  or	  otherwise	  vacuous	  use	  of	  evidence	  for	  policy.	  
Computing	  climate's	  dollars	  are	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  We	  mention	  some	  strategies	  to	  spot	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Knowing	  what	  we	  don’t	  know	  
John Kay 
London School of Economics, UK 
I	  review	  three	  model	  types	  –	  the	  cost	  benefit	  model	  (WEBTAG)	  used	  for	  assessing	  UK	  
transport	  projects,	  the	  value	  for	  money	  models	  used	  to	  justify	  PFI	  (private	  finance	  
initiative)	  schemes,	  and	  the	  value	  at	  risk	  (VAR)	  models	  widely	  employed	  in	  the	  
financial	  sector.	  	  These	  have	  a	  common	  structure:	  
− write	  down	  the	  calculations	  you	  would	  make	  if	  the	  world	  were	  completely	  
known	  
− since	  very	  little	  of	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  known,	  almost	  all	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  cells	  of	  the	  
spreadsheet	  are	  invented	  
− a	  standard	  template	  is	  applied	  to	  a	  widely	  varied	  class	  of	  problems.	  
I	  will	  analyse	  the	  deficiencies	  of	  these	  approaches	  and	  what	  might	  be	  done	  instead.	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